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This paper provides an analysis of a non-cooperative but bilateral 
bargaining game between agents in a network. We establish that there 
exists an equilibrium that generates a cooperative bargaining type of 
division of the reduced surplus that arises as a result of non-pecuniary 
externalities between agents. That is, we have a non-cooperative 
justification for a cooperative division of a non-cooperative surplus. In 
so doing, we provide a non-cooperative foundation for the Myerson-
Shapley value as well as a new bargaining outcome that contains 
properties making it particularly useful and tractable in applications. 
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1.  Introduction 
There are many areas of economics where market outcomes are best described 
by an on-going sequence of interrelated negotiations. When firms negotiate over 
employment conditions with individual workers, patent-holders negotiate with several 
potential licensors, and when competing firms negotiate with their suppliers over 
procurement contracts, a network of more or less bilateral relationships determines the 
allocation of resources. To date, however, most theoretical developments in 
bargaining have either focused on the outcomes of independent bilateral negotiations 
or on multilateral exchanges with a single key agent. 
The goal of this paper is to consider the general problem of the outcomes that 
might be realised when many agents bargain bilaterally with one another and where 
negotiation outcomes are interrelated and generate external effects. This is an 
environment where (1) surplus is not maximised because of the existence of those 
external effects and the lack of a multilateral mechanism to control them; and (2) 
distribution depends upon the precise position of agents in the graph of network 
relationships. While cooperative game theory has developed to take into account (2) it 
almost axiomatically rules out (1). In contrast, non-cooperative game theory embraces 
(1) but restricts the environment considered – symmetry, two players, small players, 
etc. – to avoid (2). 
Here we consider a set of agents who are linked by a network – describing 
which pairs can negotiate bilaterally. Our environment is such that pairs of agents 
negotiate over variables that are jointly observable. This might be a joint action – such 
as whether trade takes place – or an individual action undertaken by one agent but 
observed by the other (e.g., effort or an investment). We specify a non-cooperative 
game whereby each pair of agents in a network bargains bilaterally in a pre-specified  
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sequence (although the order does not matter for the equilibrium we focus on). 
Pairwise negotiations utilise an alternating offer approach where offers and 
acceptances are made in anticipation of deals reached later in the sequence. Moreover, 
those negotiations take place with full knowledge of the network structure and the 
ability to make terms contingent upon that structure should it change. Specifically, the 
network may become “smaller” should other pairs of agents fail to reach an 
agreement. 
We consider a situation where the precise agreement terms cannot be directly 
observed outside a network and focus on an attractive equilibrium outcome of the 
incomplete information game. That outcome involves agents negotiating actions that 
maximise joint surplus (as in Nash bargaining). Hence, with externalities, outcomes 
are what might be termed “bilaterally efficient” rather than socially efficient. 
Nonetheless, the characterisation of those outcomes involves a simple Nash 
equilibrium of a game where actions are chosen to maximise each pair’s utility. 
The equilibrium set of transfers based on the same equilibrium that generates 
bilaterally efficient actions also gives rise to a precise structure; namely, a payoff that 
depends upon the weighted sum of values to particular coalitions of agents. This has a 
cooperative bargaining structure but with several important differences. First, the 
presence of externalities alongside the restricted communication space gives rise to an 
outcome that includes the Shapley value, the Myerson value (on a restricted graph) 
and the Shapley value in partition function space as special cases. Second, those 
externalities mean that, in certain circumstances, the equilibrium outcome is the 
Shapley value allocation but over a surplus that is characterised by bilateral rather 
than social efficiency. Thus, we have a non-cooperative foundation for a cooperative 
bargaining division of a non-cooperative surplus; both of which are easy to utilise in  
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applied settings. To our knowledge, no similar simple characterisation exists in the 
literature for a multi-agent bargaining environment. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review the current 
literature on non-cooperative foundations of the Shapley and Myerson values. Section 
3 then introduces our action space which is the principal environmental restriction in 
this paper. Our extensive form game is introduced in Section 4. The equilibrium 
outcomes of that game are characterised in Sections 4 and 5; first with the equilibrium 
outcomes as they pertain to actions and then to distribution. Section 6 then considers 
particular economic applications including the resource trading environment of Gul 
(1989), Stole and Zwiebel’s (1996) wage bargaining environment, and buyer seller 
networks. A final section concludes. 
2.  Literature Review 
Winter (2002, p.2045) argues that “[o]f all the solution concepts in 
cooperative game theory, the Shapley value is arguably the most ‘cooperative,’ 
undoubtedly more so than such concepts as the core and the bargaining set whose 
definitions include strategic interpretations.” Despite this, the Shapley value has 
emerged as an outcome in a number of non-cooperative settings. Harsanyi (1985) 
noted the emergence of the Shapley value in games that divide surplus based on 
unanimity rules. However, recent attempts to provide a non-cooperative foundation 
for the Shapley value have focused, for the most part, on the outcomes of a series of 
bilateral negotiations.  
Gul (1989) proposed a game where a single agent can generate utility from 
consuming resources that are initially dispersed. His trading game has individual 
agents meeting randomly to conduct bilateral trades. Each bilateral negotiation  
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involves one agent being selected at random to make a take-it-or-leave-it purchase 
offer to the other agent. Successful trades result in the seller leaving the game with 
their earnings. Essentially, a trade is equivalent to a seller agreeing to join the buyer’s 
coalition. Eventually, sufficient trades occur that the grand coalition is formed with, 
for sufficiently patient players, the unique stationary subgame perfect outcome (with 
no delay) having each agent receive (in expectation) their Shapley value. The 
economic environment is quite specialised here, however, as it essentially amounts to 
a sequence of discrete trades. 
Stole and Zwiebel (1996) examined an environment where a firm bargains 
bilaterally with a given set of workers. While their treatment is for the most part 
axiomatic, focusing on a natural notion of stable agreements, they do posit an 
extensive form game for their environment. In this extensive form game, there is a 
fixed order in which each worker bargains with the firm. Any given negotiation has 
the worker and firm taking turns in making offers to the other party that can be 
accepted or rejected. Rejected offers bring with them an infinitesimal probability of 
an irreversible breakdown where the worker leaves employment forever. Otherwise, a 
counter-offer is possible. If the worker and firm agree to a wage (in exchange for 
participation in production), the negotiations move on to the next worker. The twist is 
that, agreements are not binding in the sense that, if there is a breakdown in any 
bilateral negotiation, this automatically triggers a replaying of the sequence of 
negotiations between the firm and each remaining worker. This new subgame takes 
place as if no previous wage agreements had been made (reflecting a key assumption 
in Stole and Zwiebel’s axiomatic treatment that wage agreements are not binding and 
can be renegotiated by any party at any time).   
 
6
Stole and Zwiebel (1996, Theorem 2) claim that this extensive form game 
gives rise to the Shapley value as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome 
(something they also derive in their axiomatic treatment). However, in their proof of 
this, they assume that the Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) bargaining 
outcome holds for each negotiating pair even though a deviation from the equilibrium 
outcome in a previous negotiation may not yield that outcome.
1 We demonstrate 
below that if the informational structure between different bilateral negotiations is 
more precisely specified (Stole and Zwiebel implicitly assume that the precise wage 
that is paid to a worker is not observed by other workers) and ‘out of equilibrium’ 
beliefs specified, their result holds. Nonetheless, as will be apparent below, our 
extensive form bargaining game – consisting of a sequence of bilateral negotiations 
based on the Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky outcome – is a natural extension of 
theirs to more general economic environments. 
Finally, we note the influential contribution of Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) to 
this literature. They do not model an extensive form game based on bilateral offers 
and negotiations but instead consider rounds where players have opportunities to 
make offers to all ‘active’ players (i.e., players who have no had a proposal rejected). 
If this is accepted by all ‘active’ players, the game ends. If it is not accepted by one 
player there is a chance that the proposer will be excluded from the game. Hart and 
Mas-Colell (1996) demonstrate that there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium of 
this game that results in each active player receiving its Shapley value. As Winter 
(2002) surveys, this game has given rise to a variety of extensions but in general the 
institutional environment requires the ability of proposers to make offers to all, for 
                                                 
1 Indeed, we demonstrate below that deviations do, indeed, result in an alternative outcome to an 
independent Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) outcome.  
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single rejections to nullify agreements and for a commitment to cause proposers to 
risk exit following rejection. 
In summary, while significant, prior extensive form games that generate 
Shapley value outcomes as equilibrium outcomes have been based in somewhat 
restrictive economic environments. Either the set of choices is restricted – as in Gul 
(1989) and Stole and Zwiebel (1996) – to decisions to join coalitions or not or 
alternatively, the institutional environment involves communication structures and 
commitment not present in many important economic environments. 
3.  Observability of Actions 
Because we consider an environment where all negotiations are bilateral, we 
similarly restrict the observability of actions to no more than two agents. We assume 
below that individual actions (such as effort expended or an investment) may be 
observable, and hence negotiable, with one other agent. Similarly, a joint action (such 
as exchange of goods, services or assets) may be observed and negotiated by the two 
agents concerned. However, in each case, other agents cannot observe the action 
taken. Importantly, what this means is that agents cannot negotiate agreements 
contingent upon negotiations that one or neither of them is a party to. To assume 
otherwise would be inconsistent with our restriction to bilateral bargaining and would 
suggest instead that a multilateral bargaining protocol might be more appropriate. 
As an example, consider an environment where there are 2 buyers (1 and 2) 
and 2 sellers (A and B) of a product. Each buyer and seller can negotiate over the 
quantity of the product traded between them; e.g., 1 and A negotiate over  1A x  and so 
on. The buyers’ values are  11 1 () AB bx x +  and  22 2 () AB bx x + , respectively. Assume that  
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the sellers have no costs. In exchange for the product, buyers pay the sellers a 
transfer; for example, 1 pays A,  1A t . Each pair trades a quantity and pays a transfer 
between them. 
The network of bilateral negotiations is as depicted in Figure 1. Notice that the 
two buyers and the two sellers are assumed here not to negotiate with one another. 
Our observability requirements will also presume that 2 will not be able to observe 
11 (,) AA x t  or  11 (,) BB x t . This means that agreements with 2 cannot be made contingent 
upon these outcomes even when 2 negotiates with A or B respectively.  
 
Figure 1: Buyer-Seller Network 
 
To formalize this, consider a set of agents,  {1,2,..., } N n = . There are three 
types of actions: 
1.  Individually observable actions by i: let  i a  be the vector of such actions 
with individual component, 
m
i a . 
2.   Jointly observable actions by i and j (i < j): let  ij x  be the vector of such 
actions with individual component, 
m
ij x . 
1  2 
A  B 
11 (,) AA x t  
11 (,) BB x t
22 (,) AA x t
22 (,) BB x t 
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3.  Transfers between i and j: without loss of generality, we will assume there 
is only one of these,  ij t  (that may be positive or negative) between each 
pair (i, j).  
As noted earlier, it is clear that  i a ,  ij x  and  ij t  are observed by i. (A1) formalizes our 
unobservability assumption. Let  { } iiN A ∈ ≡ a ,  (, ) {} ij i j N X ∈ ≡ x  and  (, ) {} ij i j N Tt ∈ ≡ .  
(A1) (Unobservable Actions) During negotiations, agent i cannot observe 
/ i A a ,  /{ } ij j N X ∈ x  and  /{ } ij j N Tt ∈ . 
 
In particular, this means that even if it is negotiating with j,  j cannot directly 
communicate to i the outcomes of a previous negotiation with k. Instead, i must form 
beliefs over those actions it cannot observe and expectations about outcomes in the 
future. We let i’s beliefs over a particular action be superscripted with i and marked 
with a tilde. That is, i’s beliefs regarding  kl x  would be 
i
kl x   .  
The results that follow do not explicitly depend upon the individually 
observable actions,  { } iiN A ∈ ≡ a , although these might prove important in applications. 
For that reason, we suppress reference to them in what follows so as to simplify the 
exposition. 
4.  Bargaining Game 
We begin by stating some additional notation, before defining our extensive 
form bargaining game. 
Set-up and notation 
The most natural way to describe the set of bilateral negotiations is by a graph 
(N, L) which has the set of agents as its vertices each connected by a set of edges or  
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links,  { } {, }{, } ,
N L Li j i j N i j ⊆= ⊆ ≠ . Thus, the potential number of links in a 
complete graph (N, L
N) is n(n-1)/2. An individual link between i and j will be denoted 
ij (or symmetrically ji). L describes the state space of potential agreements. If a link, 
ij, is in L, then agents i and j can still come to a bilateral agreement. If ij is not in L, 
then agents have reached a disagreement state. If a pair ij L ∈  were to disagree, the 
new state is denoted: L ij − . Finally, for any sub-graph, K L ⊆ , let 
{ } ()  s . t .   SK i j i j K L ≡∃ ∈⊆ . Note that  () SL N = . 
Starting with a network (N, L), agents i and j negotiate bilaterally over choices, 
() ij xK ∈ R  and payments  () ij tK ∈ R for each K L ⊆  where ij K ∈ . There are 
potentially n(n-1)/2 choice and payments variables; the (n x n) matrices of which are 
N X  and 
N T , respectively. We also define 
, NL X  the matrix of choice variables where 
0 ij x =  for ij L ∉ . Thus, if there is a disagreement, we normalise by setting the 
relevant choice variable at 0.
2 Similarly, we define 
, NL T  where  0 ij t =  for ij L ∉ . That 
is, no bilateral payments are made if there is a disagreement.  
Given the agreed 
, NL X  and 
, NL T , an agent’s payoff is 
,, , , (,)()
NL NL NL NL
ii i vu =− XT X T I  where  i I  is an n by n matrix with a 1 in each row of 
column  i and a 0 otherwise. This implies that 
, NL
ii j ij Lt
∈ = ∑ TI . Thus, we are 
assuming a transferable utility environment where total surplus generated is not 
affected by T. That is, 
,, , (,) ()
NL NL NL
ii ii vu = ∑∑ XT X. 
This notation also allows us to define what we mean by a (constrained) 
efficient set of agreements. 
                                                 
2 Note that this does not necessarily mean that following a disagreement, no action is taken. For 
instance, a jointly observed action may be within the discretion of one party. In the event of a 
breakdown, that party may take that action to maximise their own payoff. We set the index of such 
individually optimized actions to zero.  
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Definition (Efficiency): For a given K, a set of agreements { }
*() ij ij K K
∈ x  is efficient if: 
{}
*,





K ui j K
∈ ∈
∈∈ ∑ x xX . 
with  {}
,







≡ ∑ x X . 
 
Thus, an agreement is efficient for a given network (N, K), if the choices agreed upon 
maximise the sum of utilities over all agents whether they are party to an agreement 
or not. Note also that for a subgraph, S:  {}
,







≡ ∑ x X . 
Finally, for some analysis that follows it will be convenient to partition the set 
of agents.  1 { ,..., } p P PP =  is a partition of the set N if and only if (i) 
1
p
i i P N
= = ∪ ; and 
(ii) for all  jk ≠ ,  jk PP ∩= ∅ . We define p as cardinality of P. The set of all 
partitions of N is P
N. For a given network (N, K), we can also define a graph, K
P, 
imputed from a partition, P. That is,  { ,  and  , }
P
ii K jkj k K j Pk P =∈∈ ∈ . In other 
words, K
P is a graph partitioned by P. 
All of these concepts can be illustrated by returning to our buyer-seller 
network example. In this situation, Figure 1 depicts the set of links, 
{1 ,1 , 2 , 2 } L AB AB =  and we have assumed that 
,
11 1 1 () ( )
LN
AB ub x x =+ X , 
,
22 2 2 ()( )
LN
AB ub x x =+ X  and 
,, ()() 0
LN LN
AB uu == XX . An efficient outcome would 
involve 
1122 ,,, 11 1 22 2 (, ) m a x ( ) ( )
AB AB xxxx A B A B vLN b x x b x x =+ + + . If, however, 1 and A 
could no longer negotiate or trade with one another, the network would become 
{ 1 ,2 ,2 } K BAB =  and  11 (,) AA x t  would be set equal to (0,0) with 
122 ,, 11 22 2 (,)m a x ( ) ( )
BAB xxx B A B vKN b x b x x =+ + . Finally, if we were to partition the set 
of agents into P = {(1, A), (2, B)}, {1 ,2 }
P L AB =  and  {2 }
P K B = .  
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In terms of what the parties negotiate over, recall that these are contingent 
outcomes. So 1 and A could negotiate, say, a quantity  1 () 3 A xL =  and transfer 
1 () 2 A tL =  as well as  1 (1 ,1 , 2 ) 4 A xA B B =  and  1 (1 ,1 , 2 ) 5 A tA B B =  and so on. That is, 
they consider all possible states that could emerge and they can negotiate different 
quantity and transfers that would be payable upon the final realisation of any 
particular network. In principle, the transfers and quantities paid under each network 
contingency could be the same. That is, the contract could be a full commitment. 
However, in the equilibrium we focus on below, this will not be the case. 
Information regarding the bargaining network 
Earlier we stated (A1) which confined the observability of actions to those 
agents undertaking them. Also of importance is the set of bilateral negotiations that 
can take place. These are described by the network, (N, L). That network connects 
sub-groups of agents or perhaps all agents. More precisely, 
Definition (Connectedness). Agents i and j are connected in network (,) N L  if there 
exists a sequence of agents  12 ( , ,..., ) t i i i  such that  1 ii =  and  t ij =  and { } 1 , ll ii L + ∈  for 
all  {1,2,..., 1} lt ∈− . i is directly connected to j if ij L ∈ . 
 
Definition (Component). A component of network (,) N L  that contains i is 
{ } ( )  or   is connected to  i CL j Nj i j i =∈ = . Let N/L be the set of components of 
network (,) N L . 
 
Notice that all agents in a network (N, L) are connected if, for all  jL ∈ , ( ) i j CL ∈ . 
All agents are connected if, or for all  jN ∈ , ( ) i j CL ∈ . Finally, all agents are directly 
connected if 
N L L =  (the complete graph). 
Importantly, in what follows, a breakdown in bargaining between i and j is a 
situation where the network changes from (,) N L  where ij L ∈  to (, ) N Li j − ; 
implying that {() ,() } { 0 , 0 } ij ij K L ij KtK ⊆− = x . It will also be considered irreversible as  
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the link between i and j can never subsequently be restored. Thus, as breakdowns are 
possible, the network will potentially move from one with many links to graphs that 
are subsets of the original network. For convenience, we will sometimes describe 
networks in terms of states with a current state and potential future states. 
A key assumption here is: 
(A2) (Knowledge of the Bargaining Network)  The state of the network 
(,) N K  is common knowledge. 
 
This assumption is necessary in order for agents to negotiate contracts that are 
contingent upon the network state. As we will also see below, this assumption would 
be necessary if, rather than writing contracts contingent upon networks that may arise, 
agents negotiated contracts based only on the current network and renegotiated them 
in the event a new network arose (following a breakdown). Analytically, we 
demonstrate below that (A2) simplifies the ultimate structure of the solution to our 
bargaining game. 
Extensive form 
We are now in a position to define the full extensive form game. Given (N, L), 
fix an order of pairs, {} ij L ij ∈ . The precise order will not matter to the solution that 
follows. Bargaining proceeds as follows. Each pair negotiates in turn. A bilateral 
negotiation takes the following form: randomly select i or j. That agent, say i, makes 
an offer { }
, () ,() ij ij KL i j K KtK
⊆∈ x  to j. j either accepts the offer or rejects it. If j accepts 
it, the offer { }
, () ,() ij ij KL i j K KtK
⊆∈ x  is fixed and we proceed to the next pair. If j rejects 
the offer, with probability 1-σ  negotiations end and the bargaining game 
recommences over a new network (, ) N Li j − . Otherwise negotiations continue with j  
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making an offer to i. Notice that offers are made contingent upon the potential 
agreement state (K). 
This specification of an individual bilateral negotiation is essentially the same 
as that of Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) for stand-alone bilateral 
negotiations. Here, however, bilateral negotiations are not isolated and are embedded 
within a sequence of negotiating pairs. 
Belief structure 
Given that our proposed game involves incomplete information, to 
demonstrate the existence of certain equilibrium outcomes in the game, we will need 
to impose some structure on ‘out of equilibrium’ beliefs. This is an issue that has 
drawn considerable attention in the contracting with externalities literature (McAfee 
and Schwartz, 1994; Segal, 1999; Rey and Verge, 2003). 
It is not our intention to revisit that literature here. Suffice it to say that the 
most common assumption made about what players believe about actions that they do 
not observe, or that have not yet happened is the simple notion of “passive” or 
“market to market” beliefs. We will utilise it through this paper. To define it, let 
, ˆ ˆ {( ( ), ( ))} ij ij ij L K L KtK ∈⊆ x  be a set of equilibrium agreements between all negotiating 
pairs. 
Definition (Passive Beliefs). When i receives an offer from j of  ˆ () () ij ij K K ≠ xx  or 
ˆ () () ij ij tK tK ≠ , i does not revise its beliefs regarding any other outcome in the game. 
 
At one level, this is a natural belief structure that mimics Nash equilibrium reasoning. 
That is, if i’s beliefs are consistent with equilibrium outcomes – as they would be in a 
perfect Bayesian equilibrium, then under passive beliefs, it holds those beliefs 
constant off the equilibrium path as well. At another level, this is precisely why  
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passive beliefs are not appealing from a game-theoretic standpoint. Specifically, if i 
receives an unexpected offer from an agent it knows to be rational, a restriction of 
passive beliefs is tantamount to assuming that i makes no inference from the 
unexpected outcome; even if it were to accept this offer based on its current beliefs. 
Nonetheless, as we demonstrate here, passive beliefs plays an important role in 
generating tractable and interpretable results from our extensive form bargaining 
game; simplifying the interactions between different bilateral negotiations. 
Feasibility 
The non-cooperative bargaining game presented above will have an 
equilibrium whose convenient characterisation will at times rely upon agreements 
being reached in all bilateral negotiations in a network (N,  L). However, an 
equilibrium with this property may not exist. For instance, as Maskin (2003) 
demonstrates, when an agent may be able to free ride upon the contributions and 
choices of other agents, that agent may have an incentive to force breakdowns in all 
their negotiations so as to avoid their own contribution. Maskin demonstrates that this 
is the case for situations where there are positive externalities between groups of 
agents (as in the case of public goods). 
The idea that an agent or group of agents may not wish to participate in a 
larger coalition is related to the existence of the core. Here, the usual definition of the 
core will not, in general, apply as the actions agreed upon in bilateral negotiations 
may not maximise the value of a coalition. For that reason, we make an assumption 
equivalent to core existence in our bilateral context. 
For this purpose, we first need a definition of bilateral efficiency: 
Definition (Bilateral Efficiency). For a given network (S, K), a set of actions, 
ˆ ˆ (){() } ij ij K XK K ∈ = x  satisfies bilateral efficiency if:  
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ˆˆ ˆ ()a r g m a x (, { () } ) (, { () } )
ij ij i ij kl kl ij j ij kl kl ij Ku K u K ≠≠ ∈+ x xx x x x , for all ij K ∈ . 
 
Consistent with this definition, we define:  ˆ ˆ(, ) ( ( ) ) i iS vSK u XK
∈ ≡ ∑  where  ˆ() XK are 
bilaterally efficient. Given this, we can assume: 
(A3) (Bi-Core Existence) The Bi-Core as defined by: 








≡⊆ ≥  
 ∑  
is non-empty. 
 
This assumptions states that given any set of payoffs to all agents, any subset of 
agents will be jointly better off with those payoffs than with the joint payoff they 
would receive if all existing links (given L) were severed with agents outside of that 
subset; assuming that joint payoff is bilaterally efficient.  
Suppose that  (,) ( ,) vKN vK i jN ≥−  for all ij K ∈  and K L ⊆ . This is a weak 
form of superadditivity. Then the following condition clearly implies a non-empty 
core. 
Definition (No Component Externalities). 
, ()
NL
i u X  is independent of  kl x  for any 
() i kC L ∉ . 
 
This condition says that if i’s utility is not affected by actions of agents that it is not 
connected to. It is related to the concept of component decomposability in cooperative 
game theory that is an axiom on i’s realised payoff rather than condition on a 
primitive of the model. 
Notice that our buyer-seller network example satisfies this condition as b1 and 
b2 are independent of the purchases of the other buyer. However, if these buyers were 
competitors in some other market, then it is possible that their purchases could enter 
into the utilities of each other. In this case, a component externality would be present.  
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5.  Equilibrium Outcomes: Actions 
In exploring the outcomes of this non-cooperative bargaining game, it is useful 
to focus first on the equilibrium actions that emerge before turning to the transfers and 
ultimate payoffs. Of course, an equilibrium described is one in which actions and 
transfers are jointly determined. It is for expositional reasons that we focus on each in 
turn. 
The precise equilibrium transfers do not directly determine overall surplus 
generated. In this regard, we can demonstrate the following: 
Theorem 1. Suppose that all agents hold passive beliefs regarding the outcomes of 
negotiations they are not a party to. Given (,) N L , as  1 σ → , in any perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium outcome,  ˆˆ (( ) ,( ) ) XLTL , is bilaterally efficient. 
 
All proofs are in the appendix. This result says that individual actions are chosen to 
maximise own utility given expectations about unobserved actions while joint actions 
are chosen to maximise joint utility under the same expectations. It is easy to see that 
in general the outcome will not be efficient.  
The intuition behind the result is subtle. Consider a pair, i and j, negotiating in 
an environment where they have agreed to the equilibrium choices in any past 
negotiation and there is one more additional negotiation still to come and that this 
negotiation involves j and another agent, k. Given the agreements already fixed in past 
negotiations, the final negotiation between j and k is simply a bilateral Binmore, 
Rubinstein, Wolinsky bargaining game that would ordinarily yield the Nash 
bargaining solution if j and k had symmetric information regarding the impact of their 
choices on their joint utility,  (, , . ) (, , . ) ji j j k ki j j k uxx uxx + . This will be the case if i and j 
agree to the equilibrium  ˆij x . However, if i and j agree to  ˆ ij ij x x ′ ≠ , j and k will have 
different information. Specifically, while, under passive beliefs, k will continue to  
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base its offers and acceptance decisions on an assumption that  ˆij x  has occurred, j’s 
offers and acceptances will be based on  ij x′ . That is, j will make an offer, 
(, () ) jk jk ij txx ′′′ , that maximises  (, , . ) ji j j k j k uxx t −  rather than  ˆ (, , . ) ji j j k j k uxx t −  subject to 
k accepting that offer. Moreover, we demonstrate that j will reject offers made to it by 
k. 
In this case, the question becomes: will i and j agree to some  ˆ ij ij x x ′ ≠ ? If they 
do, this will alter the equilibrium in subsequent negotiations. j will anticipate this, 
however, the assumption of passive beliefs means that i will not. That is, even if they 
agreed to  ˆ ij ij x x ′ ≠ , i would continue to believe that  ˆ jk x  will occur. For this reason, i 
will continue to make offers consistent with the proposed equilibrium. On the other 
hand, j will make an offer, (, ) ij ij tx ′′, that maximises  (, () , . ) () ji j j ki j i ji j uxx x tx ′′ −  rather 
than  ˆ (, , . ) ji j j k i j uxx t −  subject to i accepting that offer. We demonstrate that this is 
equivalent to j choosing: 
ˆˆ a r g m a x (, () , . ) (, , . ) (, () , . )
ij ij x j ij jk ij i ij jk k ij jk ij x uxx x uxx uxx x ′′ ′ ∈+ +  
which, by the envelope theorem applied to  jk x′ , has  ˆ ij ij x x ′ = . 
When the negotiation between i and j is not the second last negotiation, there 
is an additional complication in that deviations by them will trigger a cascade of 
deviations throughout subsequent negotiations. Nonetheless, in the proof we 
demonstrate that, taking this into account, i and j will still not to deviate from the 
conjectured equilibrium. Essentially, even if they are the first negotiating pair, then a 
deviation will impact on every subsequent negotiation through a connected graph. 
However, in this case, they take into account all agents’ utilities in an additive fashion 
so that the envelope theorem continues to apply in the same manner as in the ‘two 
negotiation’ case.  
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Finally, it is useful to state a case where the perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
outcome under passive beliefs is efficient. Consider the following definition: 
Definition (No Non-Pecuniary Externalities). 
, ()
NL
i u X  is independent of  jk x  for all 
{ }  and  jk ij L ik L ∉∉ . 
 
That is, i’s utility is only affected by joint actions made by agents it is directly 
connected to. Notice that pecuniary externalities can still exist here through the 
transfers that are agreed upon in other bilateral negotiations that themselves impact on 
the value of an agreement between a particular pair. Given this we have the following 
result: 
Corollary 1. Assume the conditions of Theorem 1 and that there are no non-pecuniary 
externalities for all i. Then given (,) N L , as  1 σ → , the unique perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium agreements are efficient. 
6.  Equilibrium Outcomes: Transfers and Payoffs 
We are now in a position to consider the equilibrium transfers and payoffs. As 
was determined above, when there are externalities present, sequential bilateral 
bargaining does not lead to a maximised surplus. Instead, under passive beliefs, it 
yields a Nash equilibrium where actions are taken ignoring externalities on other 
agents. In this sense, the outcome is very different than what might emerge from 
cooperative bargaining. 
However, we demonstrate here that while surplus is determined in a non-
cooperative manner, under the same passive beliefs assumption, division arising from 
the same underlying non-cooperative game takes on a form attractively similar to 
cooperative bargaining outcomes. In particular, depending upon the nature of 
externalities and the network of bilateral negotiations, the division of whatever 
surplus is created gives agents variants of their Myerson-Shapley value on that  
 
20
reduced surplus. As such, payoffs have an appealing coalitional structure even if 
surplus mirrors a non-cooperative determination. 
Some definitions 
It is useful at this point to state some additional definitions from cooperative 
bargaining theory using our notation.  
Definition (Shapley Value). The Shapley value of agent i, in a given coalition, 















Φ= ∪ − ∑ . 
 
This is the definition introduced by Aumann and Dreze (1974) and it becomes the 
value derived by Shapley (1953) when the relevant coalition is the grand coalition, N. 
In contrast, Myerson (1977) provides a related value that is defined over a network.  
Definition (Myerson Value). Suppose that 
/ (,) (, )
KSL vSL vSK
∈ = ∑ . The Myerson 
value of agent i,  (,) i SL Ψ  is a function that satisfies: (i) 
() (, ) (, ) i iGK SK vSK
∈ Ψ= ∑  
for all K L ⊆  and  / GS K ∈ ; and (ii) 
( , ) ( ,)( , ) ( ,) ii j j SK SK i j SK SK i j Ψ− Ψ − = Ψ− Ψ −  for all K L ⊆  and ij K ∈ . 
 
Note that the condition on  (,) vSL (termed component efficiency in the cooperative 
game theory literature) is automatically satisfied if agents’ utilities satisfy the no 
component and no non-pecuniary externalities conditions. This definition of the 
Myerson value comes from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) which allows the value 
derived from a coalition to depend upon the network underlying the coalition. In 
relevant examples in the literature, considered below, the network itself plays a 
critical role in productivity. Myerson had assumed that a coalition would result in the 
same total value regardless of how agents in the coalition were connected.  
The Myerson value is somewhat restrictive in that it is not defined in 
situations where different groups of agents impost externalities upon one another.  
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Myerson (1977b) generalised the Shapley value to consider this by defining it for 
games in partition function space. Here we provide a further generalised definition of 
the Myerson value to allow for a partition function space as well as a graph of 
potential communications. 
Definition (Generalised Myerson Value). The Generalised Myerson value of agent i, 
in a given coalition, S N ⊆ ,  (,) i SL ϒ  is: 
1 11
(,) (1 ) ( 1 ) ! (, )
(1 ) ( ) N
p P
i





′ ∈∉ ∈ ∈
′ ≠

 ϒ= −−−  ′ −−
 
∑∑ ∑ . 
 
It is easy to demonstrate that when there are no component externalities, this value is 
equivalent to the Myerson value and, in addition, if it is defined over a complete 
graph, it is equivalent to the Shapley value. 
Some Issues: An Illustrative Example 
Before turning to consider these results, it is useful to highlight some 
important technical issues by way of an illustrative example. Consider a situation in 
which there are three agents (1, 2 and 3), each of whom can negotiate bilaterally with 
one another; that is, our starting point is a complete graph. We will denote this initial 
network by 123. If there is a breakdown in negotiations between one pair that will 
result in a network of 1-2-3, 1-3-2 or 2-1-3 respectively; with the middle agent the 
agent who has not had a breakdown with any of the other two agents. If there are two 
breakdowns in negotiations, the networks may become 12, 13 or 23. Finally, if all 
three negotiations breakdown, the state becomes 0.  
We suppose also that there are only joint actions and, using the result in 
Theorem 1, those actions will lead to a payoff to agent i of  ( ) i uK; for example, if 
network 1-2-3 occurs, the expected negotiated actions are such that  1(1 2 3) u −−  is 
generated to agent 1.  
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To see how payoffs and transfers are determined in equilibrium, note that, as 
the probability of a breakdown anywhere, σ , goes to 0, we can treat negotiations over 
transfers in each state as separate bilateral negotiations between each negotiating pair. 




11 2 121 2 2
1
12 1 2 2 1 2
(12) (0) (12) (0)
(12) (12) (12) (0) (0)
ut u ut u
tu u u u
−− = +−
⇒ =− + −
 (1) 




21 22 3 2 2 3
(1 2 3) (1 2 3) (23)
(1 2 3) (1 2 3) (1 2 3) (23) (23)
ut u
ut t u t
−− − −− −
=− − +− − −− − − −
 (2) 
  () 11 21 3 1 1 3
21 2 2
(2 1 3) (2 1 3) (2 1 3) (13) (13)
( 213 ) ( 213 ) ( 1 3 )
ut t u t
ut u
−− − −− − −− − −
=− − +− − −
 (3) 
And for 123, these are: 
  ()
()
11 21 3 1 1 3
21 22 3 2 2 3
(123) (123) (123) (1 3 2) (1 3 2)
(123) (123) (123) (1 3 2) (1 3 2)
ut t u t
ut t u t
−−− − − − − −




11 21 3 1 1 2
31 32 3 3 2 3
(123) (123) (123) (1 2 3) (1 2 3)
(123) (123) (123) (1 2 3) (1 2 3)
ut t u t
ut t u t
−−− − − − − −




21 22 3 2 1 2
31 32 3 3 1 3
(123) (123) (123) (2 1 3) (2 1 3)
(123) (123) (123) (2 1 3) (2 1 3)
ut t u t
ut t u t
+−− − − − − −
=++− − − − − −
 (6) 
With the total number of transfer prices over all contingent negotiations being 12. 
While solving for transfers would appear to be possible with 12 bargaining equations 
and 12 unknowns, equations (4), (5) and (6) are linearly dependent. For there are 
many consistent transfer prices --  12(123) t ,  13(123) t  and  23(123) t  -- that will satisfy 
those equations. In other cases, the transfer prices are uniquely determined. It is for 
this reason, that we refer in theorems to equilibrium outcomes rather then equilibria  
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themselves. Nonetheless, even though particular transfer prices are not uniquely 
determined in some networks, payoffs are. 
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11
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31 2 3 1 2 3 36
11
12 3 1 23 36
1
12 3 6
(123) (123) (123) (123) 2 (23) (23) (23)
                (12) (12) 2 (12) (13) 2 (13) (13)
                (0) (0) 2 (0)
uuu u u u
uu u u uu
uu u
Φ= + + + − + +
+− − + + − +
++ −
 
These outcomes are, in fact, each agent’s Shapley values. We demonstrate below that 
this is a general outcome in environments where the set of bilateral negotiations 
comprises a complete graph. 
Notice that these payoffs do not depend on network states where there are two 
bilateral negotiations despite that fact that  (123) i iu ∑  does not equal  (1 2 3) i iu −− ∑  
as it does in Myerson (1977). Jackson and Wolinsky (1995) demonstrate a similar 
outcome for the Myerson-Shapley value. Here, the outcome arises for the same reason 
as each pair of Nash bargaining equations represents a condition of balanced 
contributions. This is a property that makes these bargaining outcomes particularly 
useful in applications as we do not need to solve for non-cooperative action outcomes 




We are now in a position to state our main result. 
Theorem 2. Given  (,) N L , as  1 σ → , there exists a perfect Bayesian outcome of our 
extensive form bargaining game with each agent i receiving: 
1 11 ˆ ˆ (,) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ! ( , )
(1 ) ( ) N
p P
i
TP iT P PP
TT
N Lp v T L
np n T
−
′ ∈∉ ∈ ∈
′ ≠

 ϒ= −− −  ′ −−
 
∑∑ ∑ . 
 
Thus, in equilibrium, we have a generalised Myerson value type division of a reduced 
surplus. That surplus is generated by a bilaterally efficient outcome where each 
bilateral negotiation maximising their own sum of utilities while ignoring the external 
impact of their choices on other negotiations (as in Theorem 1).  
As in Theorem 1, the proof relies upon the agents holding passive beliefs in 
equilibrium. For this reason, Theorem 2 is an existence proof. Without passive beliefs, 
the equilibrium outcomes are more complex and do not reduce to this simple 
structure. That simplicity is, of course, the important outcome here. What we have is a 
bargaining solution that marries the simple linear structure of cooperative bargaining 
outcomes with the easily determined actions based on bilateral efficiency. As we 
demonstrate below, that allows it to be of practical value in applied work. 
To that end, directly following on from Theorem 2, are the following 
corollaries: 
Corollary 2. Suppose that for all iN ∈ , 
, ()
NL
i u X  satisfies no component externalities. 
Given  (,) N L , as  1 σ → , there exists a perfect Bayesian outcome of our extensive 
form bargaining game with each agent receiving: 
,, ˆˆ (,) ( )
NL NL
ii i NL u Ψ≡ − XP I  where 
, ˆ ˆ {}
NL
ij ij L x ∈ = X , 
where (a) 
()
ˆ ˆ (, ) (, ) i iSK SK vSK
∈ Ψ= ∑  for all K L ⊆  and  / GS K ∈ ; and (b) 
ˆˆ ˆˆ ( , ) ( ,)( , ) ( ,) ii j j SK SK i j SK SK i j Ψ− Ψ − = Ψ− Ψ −  for all K L ⊆  and ij K ∈ . If, 
instead, we have (, )
N N L , each agent receives: 
() ()
:















Thus, with no component externalities, we obtain the Myerson (or Shapley value) 
type division of a reduced surplus based on bilateral efficiency. On the other hand, 
with a stronger condition, we have a non-cooperative foundation for the Myerson-
Shapley value: DEFINE NON-PECUNARY 
Corollary 3.  Suppose that for all iN ∈ , 
, ()
NL
i u X  satisfies no non-pecuniary 
externalities. Given (,) N L , as  1 σ → , there exists a perfect Bayesian outcome of our 
extensive form bargaining game with each agent receiving their Myerson value. 
 
Non-Binding Agreements 
It is possible, however, that in some environments agents will not be able to 
make agreements that are contingent upon the state K. This is a central assumption in, 
for example, Stole and Zwiebel (1996) who assume that labour supply contracts are 
non-binding and so can be unilaterally broken if there is a change in a publicly 
observed state.  
To explore this, suppose that, given K, a sequence of pairs {} ij K ij ∈  is fixed and 
agent pairs make alternating offers to one another regarding a single choice and 
payment pair. If they agree, for example, to () () ,() ij ij x KtK, the next pair in the 
sequence negotiates. However, if a breakdown occurs, then the state changes to K ij −  
and a new subgame occurs in which a sequence of pairs in K ij −  is fixed and 
bilateral negotiations take place in sequence. On the other hand, if there is no 
breakdown in a sequence then the agreements { } () ,() ij ij ij K xKtK
∈  stand and each 
agent’s payoff is determined.  
This case involves non-binding agreements. An interpretation of this is that 
while each pair might arrive at an agreement, if there is a change in circumstance – 
that is, the state of agreements, K – then any individual agent can re-open negotiations  
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with any other agent it is still linked to in K. This is precisely the generalisation of the 
Stole-Zwiebel bargaining game to our more general environment. 
It is straightforward to demonstrate that the proofs of all results – in particular, 
Theorems 1 and 2 – are unchanged by this. The reason is that in those proofs we focus 
on an equilibrium where agreements contingent upon a state maximise the joint 
payoffs of the parties concerned. This is precisely what would happen if, in fact, the 
parties were to re-negotiate contract terms following the observation of a state (K) 
rather than prior to it. Indeed, this simplifies the belief structure considerably as they 
are the subgame perfect outcomes following a breakdown whereas in our contingent 
contract case they are the expectation of agreements signed by others. 
7.  Applications 
We now consider how our basic theorems apply in a number of specific 
contexts where cooperative game theoretic outcomes have played an important role. 
Gul’s Resource Accumulation Game 
Gul (1989) considers the following economic environment. Each of N agents 
has a valuable resource. The resources can be combined into bundles of M N ≤  
resources that would give their owner V(M) in utility. Moreover, max ( ) ( ) M VM VN =  
so it is efficient for all resources to be combined. Gul (1989) uses this environment 
and a specific extensive form bargaining game (based on random matching) to 
demonstrate that there exists an equilibrium (specifically a stationary subgame perfect 
equilibrium) where each individual agent receives their Shapley value. 
Here we examine the same environment but using our non-cooperative 
bargaining game. As in Gul (1989), it is assumed that all agents can transact with any  
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other agent. However, unlike Gul, we assume that there is only a single opportunity 
for this as each pair bargains in a previously defined sequence. Thus, here  1 ij xM =+  
if i purchases a resource bundle of size M from j and  0 ij x =  if i sells its resources to j. 
Agent i’s utility is  () ij ji Vx
≠ ∑  where  (0) 0 V = . 
Observe first that utilities here involve no pecuniary externalities as they 
depend only directly on trades with agents they are directly connected to. Thus, 
Corollary 3 immediately applies and each agent receives it Shapley value. Moreover, 
we can naturally extend the environment to a situation where agent utilities differ and 
there is an efficient owner of all resources. In this situation, there exists an 
equilibrium outcome where that owner receives the resources. 
Stole and Zwiebel’s Wage Bargaining Game 
Stole and Zwiebel (1996) develop a model of wage bargaining between a 
number of workers and a single firm. The workers cannot negotiate with one another 
or as a group. Thus, the relevant network has an underlying ‘star’ graph with links 
between the firm and each individual worker. A key feature of Stole and Zwiebel’s 
model is that bargaining over wages is non-binding; that is, following the departure of 
any given worker (that is, a breakdown), either the firm or an individual worker can 
elect to renegotiate wage payments. As noted earlier, while Stole and Zwiebel posit an 
extensive form bargaining game as a foundation for their axiomatic treatment of 
bargaining, the equilibria in this game are not really characterised. Nonetheless, 
Theorem 2 now provides that characterisation; confirming their Shapley value 
outcome. 
Interestingly, Theorem 2 now demonstrates that an assumption that wage 
contracts are non-binding is not necessary to motivate the Stole-Zwiebel wage  
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bargaining outcome. Instead, wage contracts could be made contingent upon the 
number of workers employed by the firm. The result would be the same payoffs to the 
firm and each worker. Moreover, Stole and Zwiebel’s key conclusions regarding how 
anticipation of this wage outcome impacts upon the firm’s ex ante choices of 
employment, capital and technology will all be preserved for the contingent contract 
case. Thus, the economic driving force behind Stole and Zwiebel’s labour market 
results is an environment that gives individual workers some bargaining power in ex 
post wage negotiations rather than the non-binding nature of wage contracts.
3 
Nonetheless, what is significant here is that, when a firm cannot easily expand 
the set of workers it can employ ex post, there will be a Myerson value wage 
bargaining outcome (as in Corollary 2). This happens if workers are not identical, 
differ in their outside employment wages, and have variable work hours. Moreover, if 
there were many firms, each of whom could bargain with any available worker ex 
post, each firm and each worker will receive their Myerson value over the broader 
network. As such, our results demonstrate that a Myerson value outcome can be 
employed in significantly more general environments than those considered by Stole 
and Zwiebel. 
General Buyer-Seller Networks 
Perhaps the most important application of the model presented here is to the 
analysis of buyer-seller networks. These are networks where buyers purchase goods 
from sellers and engage in a series of bilateral transactions; the joint actions between 
them being the total volume of trade. Significantly, it is often assumed – for practical 
                                                 
3 This is also true of the results of Wolinsky (2000) who uses an axiomatic argument to justify a 
Shapley value wage bargaining outcome. de Fontenay and Gans (2003) examine a situation where a 
breakdown in negotiations causes a link with one worker (the insider) to be severed and a link to be 
established, if possible, with a new worker. The above results do not apply to breakdowns that build 
links as well as remove them.  
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and antitrust reasons – that the buyers and sellers do not negotiate with others on the 
same side of the market. Hence, the analysis takes place on a graph with restricted 
communication and negotiation options. 
In this literature models essentially fall into two types. The first assumes that 
there are externalities between buyers (as might happen if they are firms competing in 
the same market) but that there is only a single seller (e.g., McAfee and Schwartz, 
1994; Segal, 1999; de Fontenay and Gans, 2004a) while the second assumes that there 
are no externalities between buyers but there are multiple buyers and sellers (Cremer 
and Riordan, 1987; Kranton and Minehart, 2001; Inderst and Wey, 2003; Bjonerstedt 
and Stennek, 2002).
4 In each case, however, the underlying bargaining or market 
game differs from the model here ranging from a series of take it or leave it offers 
(McAfee and Schwartz, 1994) to auction mechanisms (Kranton and Minehart, 2001) 
to a simultaneous determination of bilateral negotiations (Inderst and Wey, 2003).  
Nonetheless, regardless of the type of model, this literature is predominantly 
focused upon whether bilateral transactions between buyers and sellers can yield 
efficient outcomes. The broad conclusion is that where there are externalities between 
buyers, the joint payoff of buyers and sellers is only maximised when those 
externalities are not present. 
Our environment here encompasses both of these model types – permitting 
externalities between buyers (and indeed sellers) as well as not restricting the numbers 
or set of links between either side of the market. In so doing, we have demonstrated 
that when there are no non-pecuniary externalities – i.e., the only externalities for 
variables that are bilaterally contractible between agents occur through prices – then 
                                                 
4 Horn and Wolinsky (1988) permit externalities between buyers but sellers are constrained to deal with 
a single buyer.   
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surplus is maximised (Corollary 1). Thus, it provides a general statement of the broad 
conclusion of the buyer-seller network literature. 
In effect, Corollary 1 can be viewed as a generalisation of the results of Segal 
(1999, Proposition 3) that when there are no externalities, contracts are efficient. We 
can also characterise the equilibrium outcomes and their relationship with the efficient 
set of outcomes; generalising Segal (1999, Proposition 4). 
Theorem 2. Suppose that each xij is measured in the same increments. Then if 
{ }
** * { }  is efficient ij ij ij L ij L M ∈ ∈ = ∑ xx  and  { } ˆ () ij ij L E L
∈ = ∑ x , then if each 
,* (,  f o r  a l l    s . t .   )
NL
ii j i j uA j i j L =∈ Xxx  is non-decreasing (non-increasing) in each  jk x  
( , kj i ≠ ), then 
** () E MM ∪≤ ≥  by the strong set order. 
 
As there are possible interactions between choices, as in Segal (1999), we can only 
make comparisons (using the strong set order) between the sets of equilibrium and 
efficient choices. For two sets, A and B,  AB ≤  if whenever aA ∈ , bB ∈  and ab ≥ , 
this implies that aB ∈  and bA ∈ . The proof follows Segal (1999) directly as 
{ }
,, ˆˆ ( ) argmax ( , ) ( , )  for all 
ij
NK NK
ij i j kl kl K uA uA k l K ∈+ = ∈ x xX X x x . The significant 
generalisation is that we do not consider a principal-agent structure (or ‘star’ graph 
with links from a single agent to each other agent and no links between them) and we 
allow each agent to have some bargaining power (Segal considers situations where a 
single agent has all of the bargaining power and can make take-it-or-leave-it offers). 
Ultimately, the framework here allows one to characterise fully the 
equilibrium outcome in a buyer-seller network where buyers compete with one 
another in downstream market. Significantly, this solution can be used to analyse the 
effects of changes in the network structure of a market. For example, Kranton and 
Minehart (2001) explore the formation of links between buyers and sellers while de 
Fontenay and Gans (2004b) explore changes in those links as a result of changes in  
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the ownership of assets. The cooperative game structure of payoffs – in particular its 
linear structure – makes the analysis of changes relatively straightforward. 
8.  Conclusion and Future Directions 





Proof of Theorem 1 
As we are solving for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with passive beliefs, we 
need only consider the incentives for one player, i, to deviate. Let 
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (() , () ,() ) ( {() } , { () } , {() } ) ii N i ji j L i ji j L AL XL TL L L t L ∈∈ ∈ = ax  be the equilibrium outcome 
and also agents’ beliefs regarding unobserved actions. Let us assume for simplicity 
that i always gets to make the first offer, noting that if this were not the case, as σ  
approached 1, player i would simply reject any offer that differed from the offer that 
they would have made. 
Suppose  i is involved in s negotiations, and re-name the agents that i 
negotiates with as “1 to s”. When i comes to negotiate with player s, in her final 
round, if i has deviated in previous negotiations, i can offer a deviation that s will 
accept in this round. 
Without loss in generality, suppose that i has deviated in only a single past 
negotiation, agreeing to () , ij ij t ′′ x  rather than  ˆ () ()
s
ij ij L L = xx    and ˆ () ()
s
ij ij tL tL =   . The 
agreements between I and j in all other contingencies remain at their equilibrium 
value. By passive beliefs, this will mean that the negotiations over contingencies 
between i and s will also be unchanged. Hence, here we focus on their negotiations 
over actions and transfers in the original state L.  




ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ m a x (() , , , () / { () , () } )
is is
s
t i is ij is ij is ij
j
uA L XL L L t t
−
=
′ −−∑ x xx x x  
subject to  ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ( ), , ( )/{ ( )}) (1 ) s is is is s si uA L X L L t V σσ +≥ +−Ω xx  
where Vs is s’s expectation of their payoff if it makes a counter-offer, and  si Ω  is s’s 
payoff if there is a breakdown in negotiations between i and s and contingent 
contracts come into force; because of passive beliefs, neither of these values is 
affected by the current offer. The transfer payment provides a degree of freedom that 
allows i to make the constraint bind; therefore: 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ( 1 ) (() , , () / { () } ) is s si s is is tV u A LX L L σσ =+ − Ω − xx  
and i solves: 
1
1
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ m a x (() , , , () / { () , () } )
ˆ ˆ ˆ                                ( ( ), , ( )/{ ( )})
ˆ                                (1 )
is ii s i j i s i j




uA L XL L L






−− − − Ω ∑
x xx x x
xx   
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where the last three terms of the expression do not depend on  is x . Nonetheless, a past 
deviation may cause a deviation in future negotiations. Let us call this new value 
() is ij ′ xx. 
The issue becomes, anticipating this, will that past deviation actually occur. 
Consider i’s negotiation with j. Without loss in generality, we will assume that j is i’s 
(1-s)
th negotiation. Under passive beliefs, j’s offers will not change even following an 
alternative offer from i; as it does not use this information to revise  ˆ
jj
is is = xx   . i does 




ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ max ( ( ), ( ), , ( )/{ ( ), ( )}) ( )
ij ij
s
t i is ij ij is ij ij is ij ij
j
uA L XL L L t t t
−
=
′′ −− − ∑ x xx x x x x  
subject to  ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ( ), , ( )/{ ( )}) (1 ) ji j i ji j j j i uA L X L L t V σσ +≥ +−Ω xx  
Substituting in the constraint and i’s expected  () is ij t′ x , we have: 
2
1
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ max ( ( ), ( ), , ( )/{ ( ), ( )})
ˆ ˆ ˆ                ( ( ), , ( )/{ ( )})
ˆ ˆ ˆ                ( ( ), ( ), ( )/{ ( )})
ˆ                (1 ) (1 )
ij ii s i j i j i s i j
ji j i j
si s i j i s
s
jj i ss i i j
j
uA L XL L L
uA L X L L
uA L X L L






−− − Ω −− − Ω − ∑
x xx x x x
xx
xx x  
where again the terms in the last line do not depend on  ij x . Note that, by the envelope 
theorem and the fact that  ˆˆ (( ) ) ( ) is ij is L L ′ = xx x , this maximisation problem gives the 
same solution as: 
ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ m a x (() , , () / { () } ) (() , , () / { () } )
ij i ij is j ij ij u A LX L Lu A LX L L + x xx xx . 
Thus, there is no deviation from the equilibrium negotiations with j and hence, no 
deviation in subsequent negotiations. 
The proof for individual actions proceeds along similar but simplified lines. 
Proof of Theorem 2 
The proof of this theorem has two parts. First, we need to establish the set of 
conditions that characterise the unique cooperative game allocation in a partition 
function environment when the communication structure is restricted to a graph. 
Second, we will demonstrate that an equilibrium of our non-cooperative bargaining 
game satisfies these conditions. 
Part 1: Conditions Characterising the Generalised Myerson Value 
Myerson (1977a) examines a communication structure restricted to a graph – 
something that is extended by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) – and demonstrates that 
the Myerson value is the unique allocation of the surplus under a fair allocation 
condition and a component balance condition. Myerson (1977b) defines a cooperative  
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value for a game in partition function space but does not examine this on a restricted 
communication structure nor does he provide a characterisation of that outcome based 
on conditions such as fair allocation and component balance. Given our general 
environment here, we first fill these gaps. 
Let v(S, K
P) be the underlying value function of a game in partition function 
form with total number of agents (S) and graph of communication (K). Here are some 
definitions important for the results that follow. 
Definition (Allocation Rule). An allocation rule is a function that assigns a payoff 
vector,  (, ,)R
N NvL∈ Y , for a given (N, v, L). 
Definition (Component Balance). An allocation rule, Y , is component balanced if 
(, ,) () i iC N vL vC
∈ ϒ= ∑  for every  / CN L ∈ , where  () i iC vC u
∈ = ∑ . 
Definition (Fair Allocation). An allocation rule, Y , is fair if 
(, ,) (, , ) (, ,) (, , ) ii j j N vL NvL i j NvL NvL i j ϒ −ϒ − =ϒ −ϒ −  for every ij L ∈ . 
The final two conditions are amendments of similar conditions imposed in Myerson 
(1977a) and Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) but for the notation in this paper.  
The method of proof will be the following. First, Lemma 1 establishes that under 
component balance and fair allocation, there is a unique allocation rule. Second, we 
that the generalized Myerson value satisfies fair allocation and component balance. 
Thus, using Lemma 1, this implies that the generalized Myerson value is the unique 
allocation rule for this type of cooperative game. 
First, we can demonstrate that: 
Lemma 1. For a given cooperative game (N, v, L), under component balance and fair 
allocation, there exists a unique allocation rule. 
PROOF: Suppose there are two allocations 
1 Y  and 
2 Y  that are different, and let g be 
the  minimal graph for which the two rules are different: for some i, 
12 (,) (,) ii g vg v ϒ≠ ϒ . If i is not linked to any j, i must have the same payoff under both 
graphs, by component balance.  
Therefore, i must be linked to some j, and the two graphs must be the same 
after any link is broken 
12 (, )(, ) ii g ij v g ij v ϒ− ≠ ϒ− . Fair allocation implies that for all i 





(,) ( ,) (,) ( ,)
( , )( , )(, )(, )
                                  ( , ) ( , )





g v gi j v g v gi j v
g vg vg i j vg i j v
g ij v g ij v
gv gv
ϒ− ϒ − = ϒ− ϒ −
⇒ ϒ− ϒ= ϒ − − ϒ −




121 2 (,) (,) (,) (,) ii j j g vg vg vg v ϒ− ϒ= ϒ− ϒ  = some ∆  (different from zero by 
the first assumption), for any i and j that are connected, and, therefore, by extension, 
for any i and j in the same component h; with set of constituent agents, N(h). 
Therefore, if there are nh agents in the component, 
12
() ()




ϒ −ϒ = ∆ ≠ ∑∑ .  
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Notice however that by component balance the payoffs to all agents in a 
component have to sum up to the same thing: 
12
() ()
(,) ( () |) (,) ii
iNh iNh
g vv N h g g v
∈∈
ϒ= = ϒ ∑∑ ; therefore we have a contradiction.   
 
Next we demonstrate that the generalized Myerson value satisfies fair 
allocation. Let i and j be linked together by a graph L, where payoffs to groups are 
described by a component additive payoff function v(.|L). Suppose that each agent i 
receives their generalized Myerson value from the game (N, v, L) in partition function 
form: 
1 11
(,) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ! ( , )
(1 ) ( ) N
p P
i
TP iT P PP
TT
N Lp v T L
Np N T
−
′ ∈∉ ∈ ∈
′ ≠

 ϒ= −−−  ′ −−
 
∑∑ ∑ . 
 






(,) ( ,) (,) ( ,)
1
(, )  (, ( ))
(1 ) ( )
(1 ) ( 1 ) !
1
(, )  (, ( ))










Lv L i jv Lv L i jv
vSL vS L i j
pN S
p







ϒ− ϒ −− ϒ− ϒ −
 
  −− −   ′ −−    =− − 
 





Consider any partition P, and any set S′  of that partition. If i and j are members of 
S′ , it does not appear in the summation. If neither i nor j are members of S′ , it 
appears in the top and the bottom line of the parenthesis, and cancels out. Thus the 
only relevant case is when i is a member of S′  and j is not, or vice versa; but if i and j 
are not members of the same set of the partition, then  ( )
PP L Li j =− , and therefore 
(, ) (, ( ))
PP vSL vS L i j =−, and the term disappears.   
 
Third, we demonstrate that the generalized Myerson value satisfies component 
balance. Let i and j be linked together by a graph L, where payoffs to groups are 
described by a component additive payoff function v(.|L). Suppose that each agent i 
receives their generalized Myerson value from the game (N, v, L) in partition function 
form. We will show that for every component, C(L), 
()
(,) (( ) ,) i
iCL
N Lv C L L
∈
ϒ= ∑ . 
To do this, we first show that component balance is implied by two of the 
properties that Myerson (1977b) proved for the extension of Shapley values to games 
in partition function form: Value Axiom 2, that carriers get all the value, and Value 
Axiom 3, that adding two partition function games gives an addition of their values. 
Let  Y  be the allocation under the game (N, v, L). For a given component, C, let 
1 Y  
be the allocation so that for all iC ∈ , 
1 (,) ii N L ϒ= ϒ  and for all iC ∉ , 




2 Y  be the allocation so that for all iC ∈ , 
2 0 i ϒ =  and for all iC ∉ , 
2 (,) ii N L ϒ= ϒ . By Axiom 2, the set of agents in C gets all the value in allocation 1, 
and N\C gets all the value in allocation 2. By Axiom 3, the vector of payoffs in 1 and 
2 sum up to Y . 
Given the same C, consider a partition of N into C and N\C. Then define two 
games in partition function form with value functions, (a) 
{,\} (, )
CNC vCL  and (b) 
{,\} (\, )
CNC vN CL . Let 
a
i ϒ  and 
b
i ϒ  be the Myerson values (in partition function space) 
for an agent associated with the first and second games respectively. By the carrier 
axiom, 






ϒ= ∑  
{,\}
\






ϒ= ∑  
Now we add these two games (a) and (b) together, obtaining the original game in 
partition function form. By Axiom 3, the payoff to each agent is the sum of their 
payoffs under (a) and (b). But agents in C only have a non-zero payoff in game (a), 
therefore: 
{,\} {,\} {,\} ( , )( , )( , )( , ) ( , )
a CNC b CNC a CNC
ii i i
iC iC iC iC
N LC L C L C L v C L
∈∈ ∈ ∈
ϒ= ϒ + ϒ = ϒ = ∑∑ ∑ ∑ . 
Part 2: The non-cooperative bargaining game satisfies these conditions. 
We want to show that the non-cooperative bargaining game satisfies fair 
allocation and component balance over a cooperative game with value function 
ˆ(,) vNL as determined by bilateral efficiency. Note that Theorem 1 demonstrates that 
an equilibrium of the bargaining game involves achieving bilateral efficiency. This 
defines an imputed value function. We now want to show that for this equilibrium the 
two conditions are satisfied for the game with this value function. 
Let  ˆ
ij t  be the equilibrium transfer between each pair, ij L ∈ , that bargain. 
When i and j bargain together, let 
i
ij t  be the transfer that i offers, which would give a 
payoff  ˆˆ  and 
ii
ij vv  to i and j respectively; j’s offer 
j
ij t  would, if accepted, lead to payoffs 
ˆˆ  and 
jj
ij vv  respectively. Given that the transfers are chosen to make the incentive 
constraint bind, the offers satisfy: 
 
ˆˆ (1 ) ( , )





vN L i j v
vN L i j v
σσ
σσ
+− ϒ − =
+− ϒ − =
 (7) 
where ( , ) i N Li j ϒ −  is the payoff to i after a breakdown with j. 









i i ki ik ij ik
kk i k j
vu t tt t
− −
== + = +
=+ − −− ∑ ∑∑  




ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆˆˆˆ ˆ ˆ
j in n
ii j j
iji ji k i i kj k j j k
kk i kk i
vvvv u t t u t t
− −
== + == +
+=+=+ − ++ − ∑ ∑∑ ∑  (8) 
Using (7) to substitute out  ˆˆ  and 
ji
ij vv  in the first part of (8): 
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ) ( , ) (1 ) ( , )
ˆˆ ( 1)( 1) ( , ) ( 1) ( 1) ( , )
ˆˆ (, ) (, )
ij i j





vv N L i jv N L i j v
vN L i j vN L i j
vN L i j vN L i j
σσ σσ
σσ σσ
++ − ϒ − =+ − ϒ − +
⇒ − + −ϒ −=− + −ϒ −
⇒ +ϒ − = +ϒ −
 
Note from (7) that in the limit, as σ  tends towards zero, payoffs  ˆˆ and 
ij
ii vv  become the 
same payoff  ˆi v , and therefore: 
ˆˆ (, ) (, ) ij j i vN L i j vN L i j +ϒ − = +ϒ −  
which is the balanced contributions condition. 
Now consider condition (8) and its analogue for every bargaining link in the 











=+ − ∑ ∑  
for each i, where transfer tij is zero if i and j do not have a bargaining link. Therefore, 
for a given component, Ci(L):  
1




ii k i i ki
iCL iC L k ki iCL
vu t t u
−
∈∈ = = + ∈

=+ − = 
 ∑∑∑ ∑ ∑  
because there are no transfers to agents that you do not bargain with. The non-zero 
transfers in this summation term are all between agents in Ci(L), and, therefore, the 
summation includes both ˆ
ij t  and (- ˆ
ij t ), which cancel out. This demonstrates 
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